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In an experimental newsvendor setting we investigate three phenomena: Level behavior { the decision-
maker's average ordering tendency; adjustment behavior { the tendency to adjust period-to-period order
quantities; and observation bias { the tendency to let the degree of demand feedback inuence order
quantities. We nd that the portion of mismatch cost due to adjustment behavior exceeds the por-
tion of mismatch cost due to level behavior in three out of four conditions. Observation bias is studied
through censored demand feedback, a situation which arguably represents the majority of newsvendor
settings. When demands are uncensored, subjects tend to order below the normative quantity when fac-
ing high margin and above the normative quantity when facing low margin, but in neither case beyond
mean demand (a.k.a. the pull-to-center eect). Censoring in general leads to lower quantities, magni-
fying the below-normative level behavior when facing high margin but partially counterbalancing the
above-normative level behavior when facing low margin, violating the pull-to-center eect in both cases.
May 2009, revised August 2010, November 2011
1. Introduction and literature review
The newsvendor model is the fundamental model for managing inventory under demand uncer-
tainty and has received signicant research attention. Most of this research has taken a normative
approach, while behavioral issues { the focus of this paper { have only recently received attention.
We study two aspects of ordering behavior in a repeated newsvendor model, and a bias that
aects them both. We dene level behavior as a decision-maker's average order quantity. Using
statistical terminology, level behavior can be thought of as the rst moment of ordering behavior.
If, for example, the normative order quantity is 730, and a newsvendor orders 810 on average,
then there is a deviation of 80 between the normative quantity and the level behavior. A prevalent
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level behavior result in the existing literature is that subjects on average tend to order quantities
between the expected demand and the normative order quantity, which has been coined the pull-
to-center eect. We dene adjustment behavior as the tendency to adjust period-to-period order
quantities. Again, in statistical terminology, adjustment behavior can be thought of as the second
moment of ordering behavior. If, for example, one newsvendor alternates between orders of 809
and 811, and another newsvendor alternates between orders of 780 and 840, we say that the second
newsvendor exhibits a greater degree of adjustment behavior than the rst. Cachon and Terwiesch
(2009) give an example of such quantity adjustments with respect to inuenza vaccines, where one
would expect the same ex-ante season-to-season parameters and, hence, no strong reason to adjust
the quantity between two consecutive seasons:
There were 95 million doses of the u vaccine produced for the 2002-2003 u season in the
United States. Unfortunately, 12 million doses were not used and had to be destroyed (a
vaccine is good only for one u season). Only 83 million doses of the u vaccine were produced
for the next season, 2003-2004. (Not coincidentally, 95-12=83.) Unfortunately, in that season
there were widespread shortages, leading to u related deaths, especially in Colorado.
This example is consistent with demand chasing, which is a bias that drives adjustment behavior
and has been observed frequently within the experimental newsvendor literature.
Arguably, in most practical settings, demand feedback tends to be in the form of demand real-
izations censored by the ordered quantity, i.e., the newsvendors observe sales realizations, not
demand realizations. Furthermore, even when rms have data that could be used to develop a
rough estimate of lost sales, in our experience, they do not tend to do so. Revisiting the example
of the inuenza vaccine given above, note that it reports a specic left-over quantity for the 2002-
2003 season, but only concludes that the shortages in the 2003-2004 season were \widespread."
We dene observation bias as the tendency that the degree of feedback available { here, whether
full demand realizations are observed or if demands are censored { inuences level and adjust-
ment behavior. In this study, we manipulate demand feedback (censored and uncensored) as an
experimental treatment to induce and test for observation bias.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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The main contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, though the existing literature explores
both level and adjustment behavior in newsvendor settings, we are, to our knowledge, the rst to
estimate the respective performance impacts of these behavioral patterns. We propose a method to
disambiguate the overall behavioral cost (i.e., the increase of expected mismatch cost due to behav-
ioral deviations from normative order quantity) by estimating the eect of level and adjustment
behavior on expected mismatch cost, which we term level cost and adjustment cost, respectively.
While level and adjustment behavior are inter-related { e.g., random errors in ordering and demand
chasing can lead to level eects as shown by Su (2008) and Bostian et al. (2008), respectively {
our method serves as a useful approximation of each source of behavioral cost. Understanding the
relative magnitude of these costs can help inform managers as to which they should be most wary
of. The second, and more signicant, contribution of this paper is that it is, to our knowledge,
the rst experimentally-controlled study of the impact of demand censoring on ordering behavior.
We nd that demand censoring induces a reduction in order quantities relative to uncensored set-
tings, supporting censoring having signicant impact on observation bias for level behavior. We
also investigate the impact of observation bias on adjustment behavior, nding that the magni-
tude of adjustments are related to the degree of variability observed by subjects. These results can
help managers prioritize order quantity improvements based on product margins and the degree
of demand feedback available in the setting that they operate in.
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) initiated the exploration of behavioral issues in newsvendor set-
tings, primarily focusing on what we refer to as level behavior. They nd that order quantities
tend to be greater than the normative solution in low margin settings and to be less than the
normative solution in high margin settings, a pattern of behavior ubiquitously reported within
the experimental newsvendor literature (Bolton and Katok 2008, Lurie and Swaminathan 2009,
Bostian et al. 2008, Benzion et al. 2007, etc.). Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) show that of the ten
bias and preference structures considered, only anchoring and insucient adjustment and ex-post
inventory error minimization can explain such behavior. Since then, Bostian et al. (2008) show
that demand chasing can lead to the this \pull-to-center" behavior, and Su (2008) proposes thatRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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random error in ordering can result in such a pattern, while Kremer et al. (2010) nd empirical
evidence refuting the latter as a sole explanation.
With respect to the treatment of adjustment behavior within the literature, Schweitzer and
Cachon (2000) nd weak support for demand chasing. Bolton and Katok (2008) segment subjects
by those whose order adjustment can be accounted for primarily by their trend in level behavior,
those exhibiting a prevalence for adjustments toward the most recent demand realization (demand
chasing), those tending to adjust away from the most recent demand realization (gambler's fallacy),
and those whose adjustments were not statistically dierent from random. Others have also reported
demand chasing and trending in level behavior, which both contribute to order adjustment (see for
example Bostian et al. 2008, Benzion et al. 2008, and Lurie and Swaminathan 2009). We contribute
to the understanding of adjustment behavior by providing a means to approximate its impact on
performance. The fact that adjustment costs lead to signicantly greater prot erosion than level
costs in three out of four conditions underscores the importance of accounting for this form of
deviation from the normative prescription.
For normative models prescribing ordering policies when the underlying demand distribution is
unknown (in contrast to our setting) and demands are censored, a common result is that censoring
leads to higher normative order levels due to the value of improved demand information through
the ability to observe a larger range of demand realizations (Harpaz et al. 1982, Nahmias 1994,
Lariviere and Porteus 1999 and Ding et al. 2002). In a recent paper, Feiler et al. (2011) study
Bayesian updating in an experiment with censored observations and a newsvendor fractile of 1=2.
However, in their study it is not clear what aspects of ordering behavior can be attributed to
observation bias and what can be attributed to demand learning. To our knowledge, we are the
rst to explore the behavioral eects of demand censoring. Therefore, we extend the literature
by developing observation bias theory and studying its impact on ordering level and adjustment
behavior, nding support that it reduces average order level and attenuates order adjustment.
While various aspects of level and adjustment behavior have been reported within the literature,
measures of performance applied within the literature have only considered the impacts of theseRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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behaviors in an aggregate metric. Those who report on performance often do so in terms of total
prots (Benzion et al. 2008, Lurie and Swaminathan 2009), with others reporting prots resulting
from level eects alone (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) and others not reporting performance impacts
at all (Feiler et al. 2011). Bolton and Katok (2008) and Bolton et al. (2008) report performance in
terms of the proportion of the normative expected prot earned. Bolton et al. (2008) refer to this
measure as \eciency" and note that \it penalizes for order variability; for example, ordering 75
every period [the normative solution in their setting] is a more ecient strategy than alternating
between orders of 100 and 50." While this is true, the eciency metric still combines the impact
of level and adjustment behavior. We extend the literature by oering a means to approximate the
impact of these two aspects of ordering behavior on performance erosion. This is useful in developing
the understanding that both behaviors drive costs, and in assessing the relative magnitudes of these
costs within various settings; specically here, in high and low margin conditions and conditions
that vary in terms of the degree of demand feedback available to the decision-maker.
The next section outlines the normative newsvendor model. Section 3 describes the experimental
design of the paper and the notation related to each experimental condition. In Section 4 we
present the theory, hypotheses and results corresponding to level and adjustment behavior as well
as observation bias. Section 4.4 presents additional ndings related to learning in terms of both
level and adjustment behavior and the relationship between both behaviors. Finally, Section 5
provides a summary discussion of key results and managerial implications.
2. The Normative Newsvendor
In the normative model, the newsvendor decides order quantity Q at unit cost w while facing
uncertain demand D in a single-period environment. After demand is realized, the newsvendor
sells at unit revenue r a quantity limited by demand D and order quantity Q. Here we consider
the situation in which leftover inventory is disposed of (at no value). Dene a+ = max(0;a). The
newsvendor's decision then results in realized prot




+ is the mismatch cost when ordering Q, with param-
eters unit underage cost cu = r  w and unit overage cost co = w. Hence, the prot function (1) is
separated into two parts: The prot if one could obtain exact demand information before commit-
ting to the quantity; and the cost of demand uncertainty (mismatch cost). The latter consists of the
nancial consequence per unit of unmet demand (unit underage cost) times the expected unmet
demand, and the nancial consequence per unit of leftover quantity (unit overage cost) times the
expected leftover quantity. Let (Q)=E(D;Q) denote expected prot and G(Q)=EG(D;Q)
denote expected mismatch cost, when ordering Q. Note that expected mismatch cost is the con-
trollable part of expected prot, i.e., the only part which depends on the decision variable Q.
Hence, the minimizer of G(Q) will be equal to the maximizer of (Q). The normative solution
minimizing expected mismatch cost when demand follows a continuous distribution is the order
quantity Q which satises F (Q) = cu=(cu +co), where the left-hand side F() is the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of D and the right-hand side is the newsvendor fractile.
3. Experimental design and notation
We conducted newsvendor experiments as one session of the core logistics course in the undergrad-
uate program at The Norwegian School of Management. Each session started with a 90-minute
lecture on the newsvendor model that included explanation of the key features of the problem,
motivation of its relevance, explanation of the tradeo between underage and overage, including
which side of the mean to order on, and insight into the eects of parameters. The lecture did
not, however, include the newsvendor fractile nor a method for computing the normative quan-
tity. The lecture also specically covered the issue of censored demand realizations, and subjects
were informed that some of them, but not all, would face such situations { and that all of them
would be informed about the actual underlying demand distribution which was i.i.d. across periods.
Similarly, they were informed that some would face conditions where margin exceeded cost, while
others would face conditions where cost exceeded margin. After the lecture, students participated
in a 2x2, between-subject experiment with treatments to manipulate the margin of \wodgets" sold
(low vs. high) and the degree of demand feedback (uncensored vs. censored).Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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In the experiment, we used normally distributed demands with mean  = 1000 and standard
deviation  = 400, so that the coecient of variation was large enough to make an impact and
small enough for a normal distribution to be reasonable. All subjects experienced realizations from
a common demand path. Since all subjects also upfront received complete information regarding
the demand distribution, we can focus exclusively on the impact of observation bias, rather than
confounding its eect with that of demand learning. Furthermore, a known demand distribution
makes a myopic policy optimal, thus avoiding complications that would result from dynamics.1
Following Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), we xed unit revenue at r =12 while we manipulated
unit cost as one treatment, with w = 3, which we denote high margin good (HMG), and w = 9,
which we denote low margin good (LMG). To study observation bias, we manipulated demand
feedback, with uncensored demand, where subjects observed actual demand realizations D, and
censored demand, where subjects were limited to observing quantities sold, min(D;Q). Subjects
in the uncensored condition were also informed of underage costs, cu(D Q)
+, and overage costs,
co(Q D)
+, for each period. Within the censored condition, subjects were still informed of demand
outcomes and overage costs for periods following overage outcomes, but they were only informed
that a stock-out occurred during periods in which they experienced underage.
A total of 310 subjects participated in the experiment, with each randomly assigned to one of the
four conditions. We include the results from 269 of these subjects in the results presented within
Section 4. Of the 41 remaining subjects, 30 were dropped from the study because they did not
complete the 50 trials within the allotted time, two were unable to play the game due to technical
problems, four were excluded due to strong evidence suggesting that they had obtained demand
information, and the remaining ve were excluded for severe over-ordering. (Of the latter ve, four
had orders in excess of 5000 and one had an average order quantity 8.5 standard deviations greater
than the condition's average.) Finally, we corrected three specic order quantities of the remaining
subjects where a mistyping was obvious. Subjects completing all 50 trials entered a lottery where
1 For robustness, we also ran an experiment with a known and an unknown demand distribution described in Sec-
tion 4.4.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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each \euro" of prot they accumulated throughout the experiment earned them a chance to win
an iPod. One iPod was raed in each of the six course sections.
We use expected mismatch cost (cost of demand uncertainty) rather than prot to estimate
subject performance. We do this for two reasons: (i) It represents the controllable part of expected
prot, i.e., the part which depends on Q, and (ii) it enables us to compare the alternatives with
low and high margin goods on equal terms (since the expected mismatch cost functions of the two
margin scenarios are mirror images of each other around mean demand). In the general model, and
when making statements which are valid independent of margin, we use capital and bold-face nota-
tion for quantity decisions Q and mismatch cost G. When making margin-specic statements, we
use regular upper-case notation for HMG and lower-case notation for LMG (a notation mnemonic:
big notation corresponds to big margin and small notation corresponds to small margin). The
normative order quantities are then q = 730 and Q = 1270 for LMG and HMG, respectively.
Furthermore, we use superscript u for the uncensored case and superscript c for the censored
case. We index a specic subject (newsvendor) by i, and consider the situation in which there
are T = 50 repeated periods, indexed by t, and Dt's are normal i.i.d.. When the subscript t is
dropped, it indicates an average value over t. So subject i's average quantity when facing HMG is
Qi =
PT
t=1Qi;t=T, subject i's standard deviation of order quantities when facing LMG is qi, and
subject i's average expected mismatch cost when facing LMG is gi =
PT
t=1g(qi;t)=T.
Based on the 2x2 design employed in the experiment, subjects are members of a set determined
by condition, LU, LC, HU, and HC, which are four disjoint sets where L denotes a low margin
good, H denotes a high margin good, U denotes uncensored demand, and C denotes censored
demand. (Each subject plays one of these conditions for the entire duration of the experiment.) We





i2LU qi=hLUi, where hAi denotes the cardinality of the set A (i.e., the number of subjects
in the condition).Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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4. Development and analysis of hypotheses
In this section, we develop the theory and hypotheses related to level and adjustment behavior,
particularly as they pertain to observation bias under demand censoring. We present the corre-
sponding results within each subsection to facilitate the exposition's cohesiveness.
Conditions LU LC HU HC
I = 64 I = 68 I = 66 I = 71
Normative: Q 730 730 1270 1270
Mean 836.72 690.31 1080.76 964.13
Subjects' Median 844.05 687.70 1053.63 1043.54
average order Std deviation 118.04 146.66 140.69 236.70
quantities 95% conf. int. [807.24, 866.21] [654.81, 725.81] [1046.17, 1115.34] [908.11, 1020.16]
Min 526.26 387.00 808.84 515.90
Max 1156.98 1089.48 1466.20 1445.00
Mean 245.67 176.13 270.54 211.65
Within- Median 246.78 157.97 271.74 195.92
subject Std. deviation 82.33 81.15 85.10 90.73
standard 95% conf. int. [225.10, 266.23] [156.49, 195.77] [249.62, 291.46] [190.17, 233.13]
deviation Min 40.28 56.67 71.17 4.24
Max 445.83 479.11 462.39 519.42
Normative: G(Q) 1525.33 1525.33 1525.33 1525.33
Mean 1993.34 1800.87 2230.64 2602.65
Expected Median 1875.58 1728.86 2260.59 2336.81
mismatch Std. deviation 341.65 262.26 404.70 889.46
cost 95% conf. int. [1907.99, 2078.68] [1737.39, 1864.35] [2131.15, 2330.12] [2392.12, 2813.18]
Min 1542.19 1547.75 1595.08 1525.41
Max 3489.14 3101.20 3097.31 4665.81
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
It is important to note the unit of analysis on which we generally measure and test ordering
behavior in this paper. When performing tests on level behavior (average order quantities), we
do so on the population of subjects' average quantities Qi. The rationale behind this is that it is
individual subjects, not groups of subjects, that exhibit a particular behavioral pattern. Similarly,
when performing tests on the eect of adjustment behavior on decisions (variability of order quan-
tities), we do so on the population of within-subject standard deviation of quantities Qi since
within-subject variability represents the extent to which a subject adjusts her order quantities,
while between-subject variability reects the extent to which subjects dier in level behavior. The
descriptive statistics resulting from the experiment are given in Table 1.
4.1. Level behavior
Theory and hypotheses: level behavior in uncensored environments. Here we study subject deci-
sions (i.e., order quantities) with respect to level behavior when demands are uncensored.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) nd support for the pull-to-center eect, i.e., a tendency to order
between the normative solution and expected demand, which is consistent with anchoring and insuf-
cient adjustment as well as ex-post inventory error minimization. We expect that our experiment
will yield corresponding results when demand is uncensored.
Hypothesis 1. The order quantities with uncensored demands will fall between the normative
quantity and mean demands, (a) q <qu < and (b) <Qu <Q.



























Figure 1 For the four conditions, (a) average order quantities and (b) average standard deviation of order
quantities.
To test Hypotheses 1(a) and (b), we construct 99% condence intervals around qu and Qu. The
null hypotheses (i.e., that pull-to-center will not be observed) will be rejected at the p < 0:01
level if the condence limits are contained within their respective pull-to-center regions, which
has bounds established by expected demand and the normative order quantity (i.e., between 730
and 1000 in LMG, and between 1000 and 1270 in HMG). From Table 2, we see that there is
statistically signicant evidence for subjects' average order quantities falling within the pull-to-
center boundaries (p<0:01 for both LMG and HMG). These results are consistent with Schweitzer
and Cachon (2000) as well as the newsvendor experiments we refer to in our literature review.2
2 Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) also model other preference functions with a clear prediction of eect on orderRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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Mean s.e. 99% C.I.
H1(a) LU 836.72 14.76 [797.53, 875.91]
H1(b) HU 1080.76 17.32 [1034.80, 1126.71]
Table 2 99% condence interval of uncensored quantities testing pull-to-center eect.
Theory and hypotheses: the eect of observation bias on level behavior. Most practical newsven-
dor settings involve demand censoring. Firms typically have visibility to sales, but rarely have the
luxury of observing true demand realizations. Although the literature explores demand censoring
from a normative perspective, to our knowledge, no prior work has explored its behavioral impacts.
We posit that censoring will impact observation bias resulting in reduced order quantities relative
to when demand is uncensored.
We propose that demand censoring can induce observation bias through salience dierences that
arise from the asymmetric awareness of overage and underage costs. Lewis (1969) denes salience
as an entity or property that \stands out from the rest by its uniqueness in some conspicuous
respect." Under demand censoring, decision-makers receive more precise demand feedback following
overage events than following underage events: i.e., they receive information that is asymmetric in
its salience. We posit that this asymmetry can impact decision-making through the salience eect,
which Tversky and Kahneman (1974) oer as one factor that can inuence subjective probabilities
under the availability heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) dene the availability heuristic as
\a judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of
events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind."
Through the availability heuristic, decision makers place greater subjective probabilities on
events or outcomes that are more easily recalled. It is important to note that Tversky and Kah-
neman (1973) points out that the ease with which relevant information could be recalled from
memory aects subjective probabilities; the cognitive operations of retrieval (recall from memory)
and construction (solving the task at hand) are not necessary for the heuristic to impact decisions.
quantities. Specically, risk seeking and stock-out averse preferences would lead to over-ordering, while risk aversion,
underestimation of mismatch cost, waste aversion and loss aversion preferences would lead to under-ordering. The
latter four preferences as secondary eects would lead us to conjecture that the pull-to-center eect for LMG is weaker




) > 0. This is supported here (p< 0:01), and
is in contrast to Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), although in their case not with signicance.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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Salience eect bias arises when the availability heuristic leads to subjective probability distor-
tion relative to objective probabilities due to asymmetries in the richness or cognitive impact of
informational cues. Taylor et al. (1979) argued that salience eects impact decision-making on the
subconscious level, i.e., that they are \an automatic perceptual bias (not unlike optical illusions),
which occur without intention." They have since softened that stance, stating that salience eects
are not fully automatic because they can be overcome through training, coaching, and other \forms
of involvement" (Fiske and Taylor 1991). This implies that subjects do not have to explicitly con-
sider the subjective probabilities that they place on various demand realizations for the salience
eect to impact their decision making. Simply being exposed to the asymmetric information cues
is sucient.
In light of the discussion on observation bias above and in the introduction, we expect demand
censoring to impact level behavior according to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. Demand censoring will lead to a reduction in order quantity levels, (a) qc < qu
and (b) Qc < Qu. The dierence due to demand censoring will be more prominent for LMG than
for HMG, (c) Qu  Qc <qu  qc.
Hypothesis 2(c) arises from the conjecture that order quantities will be greater for HMG than
for LMG. This level dierence implies that demand feedback will more frequently be censored for
LMG than for HMG. Hence, we expect a stronger eect due to censoring for LMG than for HMG.
Note that, should these hypotheses hold, demand censoring will cause subjects to order further
from the normative quantity in HMG settings. In LMG settings, however, demand censoring would
cause subjects to order quantities toward (and possibly beyond) the normative quantity q, i.e.,
it would partially counter-balance the pull-to-center eect on qu. We will discuss this further in
subsection 4.3, where we discuss performance impacts of level behavior, adjustment behavior, and
observation bias.
Results. The average quantity values of the four conditions are given in Table 1 and shown in
Figure 1(a).Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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From Table 3, we see that for both LMG and HMG, order quantities tend to be signicantly
lower with demand censoring than without it (by 141.41 and 116.62 units, respectively), providing
support for H2(a) and (b) (p < 0:01 for both LMG and HMG). In fact, we nd the eect of
demand censoring so strong that subjects' ordering violates the lower bound of the pull-to-center
regions { a robust result within the literature { for both LC (two tailed t-test, p<0:05) and HMG,
although not signicantly so in the latter case. We do not nd signicance for H2(c), but it holds
directionally. (Note that unlike the other tests here, the test of H2(c), a dierence-in-dierence
test, is performed using ANOVA with contrasts.)
Uncensored Censored Dierence
(a) LMG q 836.72 690.31 146.41 t=6:34 p-value=0:0000
H2 (b) HMG Q 1080.76 964.13 116.62 t=3:53 p-value=0:0003
(c) Dierence in dierences 29.79 t=0:72 p-value=0:2348
Table 3 t-tests of the eect of censoring on level behavior
4.2. Adjustment behavior
As discussed previously, we focus on within-subject variability to assess the magnitude of adjust-
ment behavior. We do so since subjects { not groups { are the unit of analysis.
Theory and hypotheses: the eect of observation bias on adjustment behavior. It is reasonable to
expect that subjects' quantity adjustments will be inuenced by what they observe from period
to period, which, in turn, depends on demand realizations. When demand feedback is uncensored,
subjects are able to observe full demand realizations, D. However, subjects' period-to-period obser-
vations when demand feedback is censored are restricted to sales realizations, min(D;Q). The
standard deviation of demand in our setting is  = 400, while the standard deviation of sales is
increasing in Q and is bounded above by 400.
As was the case with level behavior, subjects should normatively ignore sales and demand signals
given full knowledge of the system parameters. However, as Massey and Wu (2005) illustrated
through their system neglect hypothesis, subjects are likely to place inordinate weight on signals.
Therefore, we conjecture that the more variability there is in what subjects observe, the more they
will adjust their order quantities. As a result, we expect that demand censoring will lead to a lowerRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
14
degree of adjustment of order quantities. Further, we expect that this eect will be stronger for LC
than for HC, since we expect the former to have lower order quantities and therefore less variable
sales. Note that this relationship should be interpreted with care due to its natural endogeneity,
i.e., we conjecture that the variability of order quantities depends on the variability of sales, but
as demonstrated, the variability of sales also depends on the variability of order quantities.
Hypothesis 3. Orders will be less variable with censored demand feedback than with uncen-
sored demand feedback, (a) qc <qu and (b) Qc <Qu. The eect of demand censoring on order
variability will be more prominent for LMG than for HMG, (c) qu  qc >Qu  Qc.
Results. The average within-subject quantity standard deviations of the four conditions are
shown in Table 1 and displayed in Figure 1(b) at the beginning of this section.
Uncensored Censored Dierence
(a) LMG q 245.67 176.12 69.54 t=4:88 p-value=0:0000
H3 (b) HMG Q 270.54 211.65 58.88 t=3:92 p-value=0:0001
(c) Dierence in dierences 10.65 t=0:51 p-value=0:3041
Table 4 t-tests of the eect of censoring on adjustment behavior.
From Table 4, we see that demand censoring leads to signicantly less order variability for
both LMG and HMG (by 69.54 and 58.88 units, respectively), providing support for H3(a) and
(b) (p < 0:01 for both cases). To test H3(c) we used ANOVA with contrasts. While the results
directionally support the hypothesis that demand censoring has a stronger attenuating eect on
order variability in LC than in HC, that support is not statistically signicant.
While the data support H3(a) and (b), it is unclear whether demand censoring tends to attenuate
order adjustment as a result of sales variability being less than demand variability (i.e., as posited),
or due to an alternative explanation. As an alternative explanation, order adjustment could tend
to increase in order level. By H2(a) and (b), there was strong support for the conjecture that
demand censoring tends to reduce order levels. Therefore, if order adjustment does tend to increase
in order level, demand censoring could have an indirect attenuating eect on order adjustment {
i.e., demand censoring tends to reduce order levels, and reduced order levels could tend to reduce
order adjustment.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
15
To test for such a level eect as an alternative, we focus on the uncensored demand feedback
conditions. Subjects in both HU and LU observe demand realizations, so they both are exposed
to full demand variability (as opposed to sales variability), and hence sales variability would not
explain dierences observed in order adjustment between HU and LU. However, HU and LU do
dier in average order level. Therefore, we isolate a potential level eect on order adjustment by
comparing these two conditions. We nd that order adjustment in LU is signicantly less than
HU (from Table 1, the within subject standard deviation dierence is 24.87, which is signicant
at p < 0:05).3 This indicates support for a level eect on adjustment behavior: a subject's order
adjustment tends to increase in their average order level. This, in turn, provides support for an
indirect eect of demand censoring on order adjustment { demand censoring tends to reduce average
level, and this reduction in level, in turn, tends to attenuate order adjustment.
The presence of this indirect eect of demand censoring on order variability, however, does not
preclude the existence of the posited direct eect as well. To test for the possibility that demand
censoring has both a direct and indirect eect on order variability, we estimated the following
model through OLS:
Qi =0 +1Ceni +2HMGi +3CeniHMGi +4Qi +"i;
where Ceni is an indicator taking the value of 1 if subject i participated in LC or HC and HMGi
is a control indicator taking the value of 1 if subject i participated in HU or HC. We found strong
signicance for Ceni (1 =  51:94, p < 0:01) and for Qi (4 = 0:120, p < 0:01), while HMGi and
CeniHMGi were insignicant. This suggests that demand censoring has both a direct attenuation
eect on order variability as well as an indirect eect through order level.
3 We do not include a corresponding analysis comparing HC to LC because the average observed variability (sales
variability) is less in LC than HC (a result of average order quantity being less in LC than HC). Therefore, we can
not determine if the decreased order adjustment in LC relative to HC (a dierence of 35.52, signicant at the p< 0:01
level) is due to reduced signal variability or reduced average level. Since demand variability is independent of order
quantity, the comparison between HU and LU is not confounded in this manner.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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4.3. Impact of behavior on performance
Theory and hypotheses: performance impacts. To investigate the eect of level and adjustment
behavior with and without demand censoring, we consider their estimated impacts on expected
mismatch cost. In this respect, the expected additional cost due to subject i's level behavior is
denoted4 i and is estimated by the dierence between the expected mismatch cost when order-
ing the subject's average quantity and the expected mismatch cost when ordering the normative
quantity, i = G(Qi) G(Q). Further, the expected cost of subject i's adjustment behavior is
denoted 	i and is estimated by the dierence between the subject's average expected mismatch
cost and the expected mismatch cost when ordering the average order quantity, 	i =Gi G(Qi).
It follows trivially that i  0, with equality i Qi = Q. By Jensen's inequality, it follows that
	i  0, with equality i Qi;t = Qi;8t. To summarize, subject i's average expected mismatch cost
is disambiguated into the normative cost, and the estimates of the level cost and the adjustment
cost, Gi =G(Q)+i +	i. We refer to i +	i as the total behavioral cost.
For HMG, based on H1(b) and H2(b), we expect that the level cost will be higher in censored
than uncensored demand feedback conditions. This eect is further magnied in terms of the eect
on expected mismatch cost since, by convexity of G, the further Q is from the normative order
quantity Q, the steeper G(Q) becomes. For LMG, based on H1(a) and H2(a), we conjecture that
demand censoring will partially counter-balance the pull-to-center eect, but may reduce orders
to levels below the normative solution. Consider then the case where demand censoring leads to
order quantities below the normative quantity, i.e., qc









it follows that g(q  x) < g(q +x);8x > 0, i.e., the mismatch cost is \atter" to the left of q
than to its right. Therefore, if demand censoring reduced order quantities beyond the normative
solution for LMG (i.e., if qc < q), then c would be less than u as long as the demand censoring
4 Note that we continue to follow the convention of using upper-case and bold-face notation when not being margin
specic, and non-bold upper-case for HMG and lower-case for LMG.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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eect were not so severe as to reduce quantities to a level more distant from q than they were
without demand censoring. On the other hand, if demand censoring reduces order level as expected,
but not to levels below q, then c <u would hold trivially. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
censoring will reduce level costs.
The eect on adjustment cost will predominantly depend on the degree of order adjustment
(i.e., within-subject variability of order quantities) and the degree of convexity of the expected
mismatch cost in the region of the order quantities (more convexity will lead to a stronger eect on
adjustment cost). The degree of convexity of the expected mismatch cost is quantied by its second
derivative, which takes its maximum value at a quantity equal to mean demand , and is decreasing
symmetrically at both sides of . In both margin treatments considered here, G00(Q) reduces by
about 20% from its maximum at the pull-to-center boundary Q =  to the other pull-to-center
boundary Q=Q.
When comparing adjustment cost between the censored and uncensored demand feedback condi-
tions, we conjecture that the eect of the dierence in order variability will dominate the relatively
small eect of the degree of convexity, as discussed above. For LMG, from H2(a), we expect that
the mismatch cost will be less convex in the region of qc than in the region of qu. Furthermore,
from H3(a), we expect that subjects' order quantities when demand feedback is censored, qc, will
be less variable than their quantities when demand feedback is uncensored, qu. Both of these eects
suggest that the adjustment cost will be lower under censored demand feedback than uncensored
demand feedback. For HMG, on the other hand, from H1(b) and H2(b) we expect that the eect of
the degree of convexity of G will contribute to demand censoring having a larger adjustment cost
than when demands are uncensored. However, H3(b) suggests that the eect of quantity variability
will be in the opposite direction. From the discussion above, we expect that the latter of these
eects will dominate the rst for HC, and conjecture that the adjustment cost will be lower in HC
than in HU.
Since the eect of demand censoring is expected to be in the same direction for both LMG
behavioral costs, we clearly expect the overall behavioral cost to be smaller in LC than in LU.Rudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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When comparing HC and HU, however, the eect of demand censoring on the two behavioral costs
are expected to be in dierent directions and it is unclear which one will dominate. Hence, we
cannot make a hypothesis regarding the direction of overall behavioral cost.
Hypothesis 4. Demand censoring will lead to a smaller level cost for LMG and a larger level
cost for HMG, (a) u >c and (b) u <c. Demand censoring will lead to lower adjustment costs,
(c)  u >  c and (d) 	u > 	c. Demand censoring will lead to a smaller total behavioral cost for
LMG, (e) u + u >c + c.
Results. Figure 2 shows the expected normative mismatch cost, average level cost and average
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Figure 2 Separation of behavioral costs for the four conditions.
As indicated in Table 5, we nd directional support for H4(a); demand censoring leads to lower
level cost for LMG (by 27.21), but not with signicance. For HMG, however, demand censoring
leads to signicantly larger level cost (by 517.95), supporting H4(b) (p < 0:01). Supporting H4(c)
and (d), adjustment costs are signicantly smaller under demand censoring for both LMG and
HMG by 165.26 and 145.94, respectively (p < 0:01 for both LMG and HMG). Interestingly, in
three of the four conditions, namely LU, LC and HU, we nd that adjustment cost exceeds the
corresponding level cost signicantly (by 205.30, 67.30 and 113.46, respectively, with two-tailed
t-test, p < 0:01 for LU, p < 0:05 for LC and HU). For HC, we nd the opposite to be true, level
cost exceeds adjustment cost with signicance (by 550.44, with two-tailed t-test, p < 0:01). ThisRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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stresses the importance of explicitly considering adjustment behavior in newsvendor settings in
addition to the more commonly emphasized level behavior.
Finally, supporting H4(e), demand censoring leads to a lower behavioral cost by 191.50 for LMG
(p<0:01). Though we could not formulate a hypothesis regarding HMG total behavioral cost due
to competing level and adjustment eects, using a two-sided test we nd that demand censoring
leads to a higher behavioral cost by 372.01 for HMG (p<0:01).
Uncensored Censored Dierence
(a) LMG  131.34 104.12 27.21 t=0:95 p-value=0:1704
(b) HMG  295.93 813.88 -517.95 t= 4:22 p-value=0:0001
H4 (c) LMG   336.67 171.42 165.26 t=4:76 p-value=0:0000
(d) HMG 	 409.38 263.44 145.94 t=3:72 p-value=0:0001
(e) LMG  +  468.01 275.54 191.50 t=3:64 p-value=0:0002
HMG +	 705.31 1077.32 -372.01 t= 3:11 p-value=0:0023*
Table 5 t-tests for behavioral costs. (*Two-sided test.)
4.4. Additional results and robustness
Several additional results and robustness tests were performed as a part of this research, which we
describe here.
In terms of adjustment behavior, in line with existing literature, we nd that subjects tend to
chase demand. We also nd that in the censored demand environments (where subjects experience
dierent observed variability in terms of sales), higher observed variability tends to lead to higher
adjustment behavior. Furthermore, there tends to be a positive association between level behavior
and adjustment behavior, indicating that \those who get it, really get it". We also study learning
in terms of level behavior (tending to get closer to normative quantity) and in terms of adjustment
behavior (tending to reduce order variability). While this only holds directionally for low margin
products in terms of level behavior, for all others it holds with signicance.
On a referee's request, we also studied data from a second experiment which included an unknown
and a known demand distribution as an additional treatment, resulting in a 2x2x2 study design.
As discussed in the introduction, normative theory gives a clear prescription that one should over-
order relative to the myopic solution when facing an unknown demand distribution and censored
demand. The results presented throughout this section were highly robust when testing the sameRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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set of hypotheses in the unknown demand settings. Furthermore, when comparing subjects' level
and adjustment behavior, as well as the components of behavioral costs, no results were statis-
tically dierent between the known and unknown demand distribution in the new experiment.
This suggests that our ndings are robust to unknown demand distribution settings, and also that
subjects tend to behave contrary to what normative theory suggests when faced with an unknown
demand distribution and censored demands.
5. Discussion and managerial implications
Discussion. This paper provides new insight into newsvendor decision-making by (i) proposing
a method to approximate mismatch costs resulting from level and adjustment behavior, and (ii)
studying how censored demand, a situation arguably faced in most newsvendor settings, impacts
level and adjustment behavior and costs { with selected results summarized in Table 6 (together
with results mentioned in Section 4.4).
Test LU LC HU HC
Within pull-to-center region *** ***
Below pull-to-center region ** (*)
Comparing average quantities >>> >>>
Comparing quantity st.dev. >>> >>>
Pos. relationship sales st.dev. and quantity st.dev. NA *** NA ***
Pos. relationship neg. mismatch and update *** *** *** ***
Pos. relationship pos. mismatch and update *** *** *** ***
Comparing level cost (>) <<<
Comparing adjustment cost >>> >>>
Comparing behavioral cost >>> <<<
Learning to avoid level bias (*) (*) *** ***
Learning to avoid adjustment bias *** *** *** ***
Table 6 Summary of selected results using symbols: '*' signicance, '<'/'>' signicantly smaller/larger, with
one, two and three symbols indicating signicance at levels p =0:10, p =0:05 and p =0:01, respectively, and a
symbol in parentheses indicating directional support (but not statistically signicant).
By providing a method to approximate portions of expected mismatch costs related to behav-
ioral patterns, we are able to disambiguate their respective eects on performance. The fact that
estimated adjustment cost signicantly exceeds the corresponding level cost in three of the four
conditions highlights its importance as a factor in understanding the impact of behavioral patternsRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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on the newsvendor model. In light of this, we would like to emphasize that one of the contributions
of this paper is the demonstration of how dierent aspects of the newsvendor model, a rather
complex managerial decision setting, result in an intricate combination of behavioral deviations
from the normative solution. This suggests that in addition to understanding cognitive causes of
behavioral patterns in such settings, it is important to understand the aspects of their co-existence.
We also explore the eects of demand censoring on level and adjustment behaviors vis-a-vis
the corresponding measures for uncensored demand. Despite subjects having full knowledge of the
demand distribution in all settings, censored demand leads to signicantly lower order quantities
than uncensored demand in both LMG and HMG settings, with the results being robust to settings
where the demand distribution is unknown. This demand censoring eect led to a signicant
increase relative to the uncensored setting of level costs in the HMG setting equal to 175.0% (34.0%
of the normative mismatch cost) and a non-signicant reduction relative to the uncensored setting
in level costs in the LMG setting equal to 20.7% (1.8% of the normative mismatch cost). In terms
of adjustment behavior, we found that censoring suppressed subjects' order variability relative to
uncensored settings, and conjectured that the reduction in observed variability due to censoring is
a signicant driver of this reduced adjustment behavioral. Our results support the conjecture that
the magnitude of adjustments is driven, at least in part, by the degree of variability that subjects
observe. As a result, demand censoring led to a signicantly lower adjustment cost (by 35.7%) than
with uncensored demand feedback (9.6% of normative mismatch cost) in the HMG setting, and
a signicantly lower adjustment cost (by 49.1%) than with uncensored demand feedback (10.8%
of normative mismatch costs) in the LMG setting. The overall eect of demand censoring was a
signicant increase in behavioral costs relative to the uncensored setting in HMG of 52.7% (24.4%
of mismatch costs), and a signicant decrease of behavioral costs relative to the uncensored setting
in LMG of 41.1% (12.6% of mismatch costs). These results indicate that more information through
full demand feedback can actually lead to worse performance due to behavioral tendencies.
Managerial implications. This research provides managers with insight into how both order
adjustment and order level impact behavioral mismatch costs. Further, our results provide guidanceRudi and Drake: Observation bias eects on level and adjustment behavior
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as to which of these sources of behavioral cost managers are likely to be most exposed to given the
per unit protability of the product that they manage { LMG or HMG { and given the setting
that they operate under { uncensored or censored demand feedback. As adjustment behavior is
addressed by improving the consistency with which an order policy is applied, and order level is
addressed by improving the accuracy of that policy with respect to the normative quantity, these
results can help managers prioritize improvement eorts. Our results suggest that managers in
LMG settings would tend to have greater exposure to adjustment costs regardless of the demand
censoring setting. Managers in HMG uncensored settings would also tend to have greater exposure
to adjustment costs while managers in HMG censored settings would tend to be more exposed to
level costs. Improvements to the consistency with which an order policy is applied, and its accuracy
relative to the normative quantity could be prioritized accordingly.
In general, changing how order quantity decisions are made preferably comes by building aware-
ness of level and adjustment costs and their sources. Fiske and Taylor (1991) found that salience
eects, the posited mechanism driving the dierence in observation bias between uncensored and
censored settings, can be overcome through training and coaching. Further, Bolton and Katok
(2008) found that personal experience led to the greatest improvement in performance within their
study. In this vein, the research presented here has also resulted in a pedagogical case, Ludo (A)
and (B). The case describes a setting that involves LMG, HMG and censored demand, and intro-
duces the newsvendor concept. After completing a series of periods through the web-based game,
students are led in a discussion on level and adjustment costs using the decisions that they made.
At the time of this writing, this case has been adopted for MBA core operations classes, Executive
MBA programs, and for Executive Education Programs, training about 3,000 current and future
managers and executives in the key concepts of the newsvendor model and its central behavioral
issues.
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